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Abstract—This paper considers the problem of single-server
single-message private information retrieval with coded side
information (PIR-CSI). In this problem, there is a server storing
a database, and a user which knows a linear combination of
a subset of messages in the database as a side information.
The number of messages contributing to the side information
is known to the server, but the indices and the coefficients of
these messages are unknown to the server. The user wishes
to download a message from the server privately, i.e., without
revealing which message it is requesting, while minimizing the
download cost. In this work, we consider two different settings
for the PIR-CSI problem depending on the demanded message
being or not being one of the messages contributing to the side
information. For each setting, we prove an upper bound on
the maximum download rate as a function of the size of the
database and the size of the side information, and propose a
protocol that achieves the rate upper-bound.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the original setting of the private information retrieval
(PIR) problem [1], a user wishes to download (with minimum
cost) a message belonging to a database of K messages
privately, i.e., without revealing which message it is request-
ing, from a single server or multiple servers each storing
a copy of the database. In a single-server setting or a
multiple-server setting when the servers collude, in order
to achieve privacy in an information-theoretic sense, the
user must download the whole database [1]. However, when
the database is replicated on multiple non-colluding servers
(see, e.g., [2], [3]), or coded versions of the data are stored
on the servers (e.g., see [4], [5]), or the user has some
side information about the database (see, e.g., [6]–[10]),
the user can achieve the information-theoretic privacy more
efficiently than downloading the whole database. The multi-
message setting of PIR problem has also been studied in [11],
[12], where the user wishes to download multiple messages
privately, instead of only one message as in the single-
message setting, from a single server or multiple servers.
In this paper, we study the single-server single-message
PIR problem when the user knows a linear combination of a
subset of M messages in the database as a side information.
This problem generalizes those previously studied in the
single-server single-message PIR setting. In particular, we
assume that the indices and coefficients of the messages
contributing to the user’s side information are unknown to
the server, and the user’s demanded message may or may not
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be one of the messages in the side information. This type of
side information can be motivated by several scenarios. For
example, the user may have overheard some coded packets
over a wireless broadcast channel, or some part of the user’s
information, which is locally stored using an erasure code,
may be lost and not recoverable locally.
A. Main Contributions
In this work, we characterize the capacity of the PIR-
CSI problem, defined as the supremum of all achievable
download rates, in a single-server single-message setting as
a function of the size of the database (K) and the size of the
side information (M ). In particular, for the setting in which
the user’s demand is not one of the messages contributing
to its side information, we prove that the capacity is equal
to ⌈ K
M+1⌉
−1 for any 0 ≤ M < K . Interestingly, the
capacity of PIR with (uncoded) side information [6] is also
equal to ⌈ K
M+1⌉
−1 where M is the number of messages
available at the user. This shows that there will be no loss
in capacity, when compared to the case that the user knows
M messages separately, even if the user knows only one
linear combination of M messages. Also, for the setting in
which the demanded message is contributing to the user’s
side information, we prove that the capacity is equal to 1
for M = 2 and M = K , and is equal to 12 for any
3 ≤M ≤ K − 1. This is interesting because it shows that,
no matter what the size of the side information is, the user
can privately retrieve any message contributing to its side
information with a download cost at most twice the cost
of downloading the message directly. The proof of converse
for each setting is based on information-theoretic arguments,
and for the achievability proofs, for different cases ofM , we
propose different PIR protocols which are all based on the
idea of randomized non-uniform partitioning.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Let q ≥ 3, m ≥ 1, K ≥ 1, and 0 ≤ M ≤ K be integers.
Let Fq be a finite field of size q, and let Fqm be an extension
field of Fq of size q
m. Let F×q be the multiplicative group
of Fq, i.e., F
×
q , Fq \ {0}. For a positive integer i, denote
[i] , {1, . . . , i}, and let [0] , ∅.
We assume that there is a server storing a set X of
K messages X1, . . . , XK , with each message Xi being
independently and uniformly distributed over Fqm , i.e.,
H(X1) = · · · = H(XK) = L and H(X1, . . . , XK) = KL,
where L , m log2 q. Also, we assume that there is a
user that wishes to retrieve a message XW from the server
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for some W ∈ [K], and knows a linear combination
Y [S,C] ,
∑
i∈S ciXi for some S , {i1, . . . , iM} ∈ S and
some C , {ci1 , . . . , ciM } ∈ C, where S is the set of all
subsets of [K] of size M , and C is the set of all ordered sets
of size M (i.e., all sequences of length M ) with elements
from F×q . We refer to W as the demand index, XW as the
demand, Y [S,C] as the side information, and M as the side
information size.
Let S, C , and W be random variables representing S, C,
and W , respectively. Denote the probability mass function
(pmf) of S by pS(.), the pmf of C by pC(.), and the
conditional pmf of W given S by pW |S(.|.).
We assume that S is uniformly distributed over S, i.e.,
pS(S) =
1(
K
M
) , S ∈ S,
and C is uniformly distributed over C, i.e.,
pC(C) =
1
(q − 1)M
, C ∈ C.
Also, we consider two different models for the conditional
pmf of W given S = S as follows:
Model I: W is uniformly distributed over [K] \ S, i.e.,
pW |S(W |S) =
{
1
K−M , W 6∈ S,
0, otherwise.
Model II: W is uniformly distributed over S, i.e.,
pW |S(W |S) =
{
1
M
, W ∈ S,
0, otherwise;
(Note that the model I is valid for 0 ≤ M < K , and the
model II is valid for 0 < M ≤ K .)
Let I [W,S] be an indicator function such that I [W,S] = 1
if W ∈ S, and I [W,S] = 0 if W 6∈ S. In the model I,
I [W,S] = 0, and in the model II, I [W,S] = 1.
We assume that I [W,S] is known to the server a priori.
We also assume that the server knows the size of S (i.e.,
M ) and the pmf’s pS(.), pC(.), and pW |S(.|.), whereas the
realizations S, C, and W are unknown to the server a priori.
For any S, C, and W , in order to retrieve XW , the user
sends to the server a query Q[W,S,C], which is a (potentially
stochastic) function of W , S, C, and Y , and is independent
of any Y ′ =
∑
i∈S′ c
′
iXi where S
′ ⊆ [K] and C′ =
{c′1, . . . , c
′
|S′|}, c
′
i ∈ F
×
q such that (S
′, C′) 6= (S,C), i.e.,
I(Y ′;Q[W,S,C]) = 0.
The query Q[W,S,C] must protect the privacy of the user’s
demand index W from the perspective of the server, i.e.,
P(W =W ′|Q[W,S,C], X1, . . . , XK) =
1
K
W ′ ∈ [K].
This condition is referred to as the privacy condition.
Upon receiving Q[W,S,C], the server sends to the user an
answer A[W,S,C], which is a (deterministic) function of the
query Q[W,S,C] and the messages in X , i.e.,
H(A[W,S,C]|Q[W,S,C], X1, . . . , XK) = 0.
The answer A[W,S,C] along with the side information Y [S,C]
must enable the user to retrieve the demand XW , i.e.,
H(XW |A
[W,S,C], Q[W,S,C], Y [S,C]) = 0.
This condition is referred to as the recoverability condition.
By the privacy and recoverability conditions, it follows
that for anyW , S, C and anyW ′ ∈ [K], there exists Y [S
′,C′]
for some S′ ∈ S and some C′ ∈ C such that I [W
′,S′] =
I [W,S], and
H(XW ′ |A
[W,S,C], Q[W,S,C], Y [S
′,C′]) = 0.
If there is no Y [S
′,C′] such that XW ′ is
recoverable from A[W,S,C] and Y [S
′,C′], i.e.,
H(XW ′ |A[W,S,C], Q[W,S,C], Y [S
′,C′]) 6= 0 for all S′ ∈ S
and all C′ ∈ C such that I [W
′,S′] = I [W,S], then from the
server’s perspective, W ′ cannot be the user’s demand index,
i.e., P(W = W ′|Q[W,S,C]) = 0, and W cannot be private.
For each model (I or II), the problem is to design a query
Q[W,S,C] and an answer A[W,S,C] for any W , S, and C
that satisfy the privacy and recoverability conditions. We
refer to this problem as single-server single-message Private
Information Retrieval (PIR) with Coded Side Information
(CSI), or PIR-CSI for short. Specifically, we refer to PIR-CSI
under the model I as the PIR-CSI–I problem, and PIR-CSI
under the model II as the PIR-CSI–II problem.
A collection of Q[W,S,C] and A[W,S,C] for allW , S, and C
such that I [W,S] = 0 or I [W,S] = 1, which satisfy the privacy
and recoverability conditions, is referred to as a PIR-CSI–I
protocol or a PIR-CSI–II protocol, respectively.
The rate of a PIR-CSI–I or PIR-CSI–II protocol is defined
as the ratio of the entropy of a message, i.e., L, to the average
entropy of the answer, i.e., H(A[W ,S,C]), where the average
is taken over all W , S, and C such that I [W,S] = 0 or
I [W,S] = 1, respectively. That is, for a PIR-CSI–I or PIR-
CSI–II protocol, H(A[W ,S,C]) is given by∑
H(A[W,S,C])pW |S(W |S)pS(S)pC(C),
where the summation is over all W , S, and C such that
I [W,S] = 0 or I [W,S] = 1, respectively.
The capacity of PIR-CSI–I or PIR-CSI–II problem, re-
spectively denoted by CI or CII, is defined as the supremum
of rates over all PIR-CSI–I or PIR-CSI–II protocols, respec-
tively. (The notations CI and CII should not be confused with
the notation for set C.)
In this work, our goal is to characterize CI and CII, and
to design a PIR-CSI–I protocol that achieves the capacity CI
and a PIR-CSI–II protocol that achieves the capacity CII.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present our main results. Theorem 1
characterizes the capacity of PIR-CSI–I problem, CI, and
Theorem 2 characterizes the capacity of PIR-CSI–II problem,
CII, for different values of K and M . The proofs of Theo-
rems 1 and 2 are given in Sections IV and V, respectively.
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Theorem 1. The capacity of PIR-CSI–I problem with K
messages and side information size 0 ≤M < K is given by
CI =
⌈
K
M + 1
⌉−1
.
The proof consists of two parts. In the first part, we lower
bound the average entropy of the answer, H(A[W ,S,C]), or
equivalently, upper bound the rate of any PIR-CSI–I protocol.
In the second part, we construct a PIR-CSI–I protocol which
achieves this rate upper-bound.
Theorem 2. The capacity of PIR-CSI–II problem with K
messages and side information size 0 < M ≤ K is given by
CII =


∞, M = 1,
1, M = 2,K
1
2 , 3 ≤M ≤ K − 1.
For the case of M = 1, the proof is straightforward. In
this case, the user has one (and only one) message in its side
information, and it demands the same message. A PIR-CSI–
II protocol for this case is to send no query, and receive no
answer. Since the (average) entropy of the answer is zero,
the rate of this protocol is infinity, and so is the capacity.
For each of the other cases of M , the proof consists of
two parts. In the first part, we provide a lower bound on
H(A[W ,S,C]), or equivalently, an upper bound on the rate
of any PIR-CSI–II protocol, for each case. In the second
part, we construct a PIR-CSI–II protocol for each case which
achieves the corresponding upper-bound on the rate.
IV. THE PIR-CSI–I PROBLEM
A. Proof of Converse for Theorem 1
Lemma 1. For 0 ≤M < K , CI ≤ ⌈
K
M+1⌉
−1
.
Proof: Suppose that the user wishes to retrieve XW for
a given W ∈ [K], and it knows Y = Y [W,S] for given
S ∈ S and C ∈ C such that I [W,S] = 0. The user sends to
the server a query Q = Q[W,S,C], and the server responds to
the user by an answer A = A[W,S,C]. We need to show
that H(A[W ,S,C]) is lower bounded by ⌈ K
M+1⌉L. Since
H(A[W ,S,C]) is the average entropy of the answer, it suffices
to show that H(A) is lower bounded by ⌈ K
M+1⌉L. The proof
proceeds as follows:
H(A) ≥ H(A|Q, Y )
= H(A,XW |Q, Y ) (1)
= H(XW |Q, Y ) +H(A|Q,XW , Y )
= H(XW ) +H(A|Q,XW , Y ) (2)
where (1) holds because H(A,XW |Q, Y ) = H(A|Q, Y ) +
H(XW |A,Q, Y ), and H(XW |A,Q, Y ) = 0 (by the recover-
ability condition); and (2) holds since XW is independent of
(Q, Y ) (noting that W 6∈ S), and H(XW |Q, Y ) = H(XW ).
Now, we lower bound H(A|Q,XW , Y ). There are two
cases: (i) W ∪ S = [K], and (ii) W ∪ S 6= [K]. In
the case (i), M = K − 1, and so, ⌈ K
M+1⌉L = L. Since
H(A|Q,XW , Y ) ≥ 0, then H(A) ≥ H(XW ) = L (by (2)).
In the case (ii), we arbitrarily choose a message, say
XW1 , from the set of remaining messages, i.e.,W1 6∈W ∪ S.
By the privacy and recoverability conditions, there exists
Y1 = Y
[S1,C1] for some S1 ∈ S and some C1 ∈ C
such that I [W1,S1] = 0 and H(XW1 |A,Q, Y1) = 0.
Since conditioning does not increase the entropy, then
H(XW1 |A,Q,XW , Y, Y1) = 0. Thus,
H(A|Q,XW , Y ) ≥ H(A|Q,XW , Y, Y1)
= H(A,XW1 |Q,XW , Y, Y1) (3)
= H(XW1 |Q,XW , Y, Y1)
+H(A|Q,XW , XW1 , Y, Y1)
= H(XW1)
+H(A|Q,XW , XW1 , Y, Y1) (4)
where (3) holds because H(A,XW1 |Q,XW , Y, Y1) =
H(A|Q,XW , Y, Y1) + H(XW1 |A,Q,XW , Y, Y1), and
H(XW1 |A,Q,XW , Y, Y1) = 0 (by the assumption);
and (4) follows from the independence of XW1 and
(Q,XW , Y, Y1) (noting that W1 6∈ W ∪ S ∪ S1), and
H(XW1 |Q,XW , Y, Y1) = H(XW1).
Let n , ⌈ K
M+1⌉. Similarly as above, it can be shown
that for all i ∈ [n − 1] there exist W1, . . . ,Wi ∈ [K],
S1, . . . , Si ∈ S, and C1, . . . , Ci ∈ C (and accordingly,
Y1, . . . , Yi), where Wi 6∈ ∪j∈[i−1](Wj ∪ Sj) ∪ (W ∪ S),
such that I [Wi,Si] = 0, and
H(XWi |A,Q,XW , XW1 , . . . , XWi−1 , Y, Y1, . . . , Yi) = 0.
Note that |∪j∈[i](Wj ∪Sj)∪ (W ∪S)|≤ (M +1)(i+1) for
all i ∈ [n− 1]. Repeating a similar argument as before,
H(A|Q,XW , XW1 , . . . , XWi−1 , Y, Y1, . . . , Yi−1) ≥ H(XWi)
+H(A|Q,XW , XW1 , . . . , XWi , Y, Y1, . . . , Yi)
for all i ∈ [n− 1]. Putting these lower bounds together,
H(A|Q,XW , Y ) ≥
n−1∑
i=1
H(XWi)
+H(A|Q,XW , XW1 , . . . , XWn−1 , Y, Y1, . . . , Yn−1),
and subsequently,
(5)H(A|Q,XW , Y ) ≥
n−1∑
i=1
H(XWi) = (n− 1)H(XW )
since H(XW1) = · · · = H(XWn−1) = H(XW ). Putting (2)
and (9) together,
H(A) ≥ nH(XW ) =
⌈
K
M + 1
⌉
L,
as was to be shown.
B. Proof of Achievability for Theorem 1
In this section, we propose a PIR-CSI–I protocol for
arbitrary K ≥ 1 and 0 ≤M ≤ K − 1.
Assume, without loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), that S =
{1, . . . ,M} and C = {c1, . . . , cM}.
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Randomized Partitioning (RP) Protocol: The RP protocol
consists of four steps as follows:
Step 1: The user constructs n , ⌈ K
M+1⌉ (ordered) sets
Q1, . . . , Qn of indices in [K], each of size M + 1, and n
(ordered) sets Q′1, . . . , Q
′
n of elements in F
×
q , each of size
M + 1.
For constructing Q1, . . . , Qn, l , (M + 1)n−K extra
indices are required. The procedure of selecting these extra
indices is as follows. First, the user randomly chooses two
integers s and r according to a joint pmf ps,r(s, r) given by
ps,r(s, r) =
{
αn,rβs,rP, s+ r = l − 1,
2αn,rβs,rP, s+ r = l,
where αn,r = 1 for 1 ≤ n ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ r ≤ l, and
αn,r =
((M + 1)(n− 1)− 2r)! ((M + 1)! )2
((M + 1)(n− 1))! ((M − r + 1)! )2
for n ≥ 3 and 0 ≤ r ≤ l; βs,r =
(
M
s
)(
K−M−1
r
)
/
(
M
l−1
)
for all s and r such that l − 1 ≤ s+ r ≤ l, and βs,r = 0
otherwise; and P is the (unique) solution of the equation∑
s,r ps,r(s, r) = 1 where the sum is over all s and r.
If s + r = l, the user randomly selects s indices from S
and r indices from R , [K] \ (W ∪ S). If s + r = l − 1,
the user selects the index W along with s and r randomly
chosen indices from S and R, respectively. Denote by V
the set of r selected indices from R, and by U the set of l
selected indices fromW , S, and R. Note that the probability
of any specific realization of U is given by
ps,r(s, r)(
M
s
)(
K−M−1
r
) .
Next, the user creates the set Q1 = {W, 1, . . . ,M}, and
assigns all indices in V to the set Q2 (if exists, i.e., n ≥
2) and the set Q3 (if exists, i.e., n ≥ 3). Then, the user
assignsM+1−r randomly selected indices from U ∪R \ V
(or respectively, U ∪ R \ Q2) to Q2 (or respectively, Q3).
Next, the user randomly partitions all (M + 1)(n− 1)− 2r
indices in U ∪R \ (Q2 ∪Q3) (if any) into the remaining
n − 3 sets Q4, . . . , Qn (if exist, i.e., n ≥ 4), each of size
M + 1. Note that the probability of a specific realization of
such a partitioning is given by
Pn,r ,
{
2(n−3)!((M−r+1)!)2((M+1)!)n−3
((M+1)(n−1)−2r)! , n ≥ 3, 0 ≤ r ≤ l,
1, n < 3, 0 ≤ r ≤ l.
For constructingQ′1, . . . , Q
′
n, the user creates the set Q
′
1 =
{c, c1, . . . , cM} where c is chosen from F×q at random, and
it creates each of the sets Q′2, . . . , Q
′
n by randomly choosing
M + 1 elements from F×q .
Step 2: The user randomly rearranges the elements of each
set Qi and Q
′
i, and constructs Q
∗
i = (Qi, Q
′
i) for all i ∈ [n].
The user then reorders Q∗1, . . . , Q
∗
n by a randomly chosen
permutation σ : [n] 7→ [n], and sends to the server the query
Q[W,S,C] = {Q∗
σ−1(1), . . . , Q
∗
σ−1(n)}.
Step 3: By using Q∗i = (Qi, Q
′
i), the server com-
putes Ai =
∑M+1
j=1 cijXij for all i ∈ [n] where Qi =
{i1, . . . , iM+1} and Q′i = {ci1 , . . . , ciM+1}, and it sends to
the user the answer A[W,S,C] = {Aσ−1(1), . . . , Aσ−1(n)}.
Step 4: Upon receiving the answer from the server, the
user retrieves XW by subtracting off the contribution of its
side information Y [S,C] from Aσ(1) = cXW +
∑M
i=1 ciXi.
Lemma 2. The RP protocol is a PIR-CSI–I protocol, and
achieves the rate ⌈ K
M+1⌉
−1
.
Proof: In the RP protocol (Step 3), the answer A[W,S,C]
consists of n pieces of information A1, . . . , An, where each
Ai is a linear combination of M + 1 messages in X .
Since X1, . . . , XK are uniformly and independently dis-
tributed over Fqm and A1, . . . , An are linearly independent
combinations of X1, . . . , XK over Fq, then A1, . . . , An are
uniformly and independently distributed over Fqm . That is,
H(A1) = · · · = H(An) = m log q = L, and H(A[W,S,C]) =
H(A1) + · · ·+H(An) = nL. Since H(A[W,S,C]) = nL for
all W,S,C such that I [W,S] = 0, then the average entropy
of the answer over all W,S,C such that I [W,S] = 0, i.e.,
H(A[W ,S,C]), is equal to nL. Thus, the rate of the RP
protocol is equal to L
nL
= 1
n
= ⌈ K
M+1⌉
−1
.
From Step 4 of the RP protocol, it should be obvious that
the recoverability condition is satisfied. To prove that the
RP protocol satisfies the privacy condition, we need to show
that P(W = W ′|Q[W,S,C], X1 . . . , XK) =
1
K
for all W ′ ∈
[K]. Since the RP protocol does not depend on the contents
of the messages X1, . . . , XK , then it is sufficient to prove
that P(W = W ′|Q[W,S,C]) = 1
K
for all W ′ ∈ [K]. By the
application of the total probability theorem and Bayes’ rule,
to show that the RP protocol satisfies the privacy condition,
it suffices to show that P(Q[W,S,C]|W = W ′) is the same for
all W ′ ∈ [K]. Since all possible collections {Q′1, . . . , Q
′
n}
are equiprobable, it suffices to show that P(Q|W = W ′) is
the same for all W ′ ∈ [K], where Q , {Q1, . . . , Qn}.
Each set Qi consists of two disjoint subsets Ii and
Ji = Qi \ Ii where Ii is the set of all indices in Qi that
belong to no other set Qj . Note that |I1 ∪ · · · ∪ In|= K − l
and |J1 ∪ · · · ∪ Jn|= l. Consider an arbitrary W ′ ∈ [K].
There are two cases: (i) W ′ ∈ Ji and W ′ ∈ Jj for some
i, j ∈ [n], i 6= j, and (ii) W ′ ∈ Ik for some k ∈ [n].
In the case (i),
P(Q|W = W ′) = P(Q|W =W ′,S = Ii ∪ Ji \ {W
′})
× P(S = Ii ∪ Ji \ {W
′}|W = W ′)
+ P(Q|W =W ′,S = Ij ∪ Jj \ {W
′})
× P(S = Ij ∪ Jj \ {W
′}|W = W ′)
=
ps,r(si, ri)(
M
si
)(
K−M−1
ri
)(
K−1
M
)Pn,ri
+
ps,r(sj , rj)(
M
sj
)(
K−M−1
rj
)(
K−1
M
)Pn,rj
where si = |Ji|−1, ri = l − |Ji|, sj = |Jj |−1, and
rj = l − |Jj |, and ps,r(s, r) and Pn,r are defined as in the
protocol. Note that P(S = Ii ∪ Ji \ {W ′}|W = W ′) and
P(S = Ii ∪ Ji \ {W ′}|W = W ′) are equal to
1
(K−1M )
. (Note
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that 0 ≤ si, ri, sj , rj ≤ l − 1.) In the case (ii),
P(Q|W = W ′) = P(Q|W =W ′,S = Ik ∪ Jk \ {W
′})
× P(S = Ik ∪ Jk \ {W
′}|W =W ′)
=
ps,r(sk, rk)(
M
sk
)(
K−M−1
rk
)(
K−1
M
)Pn,rk
where sk = |Jk|, and rk = l − |Jk|. (Note that
0 ≤ sk, rk ≤ l.) Define
f(s, r) ,
ps,r(s, r)(
M
s
)(
K−M−1
r
)(
K−1
M
)Pn,r, 0 ≤ s, r ≤ l.
Note that, in the case (i), P(Q|W = W ′) = f(si, ri) +
f(sj , rj) for some si, ri, sj, rj such that si+ ri = l− 1 and
sj + rj = l − 1, and in the case (ii), P(Q|W = W
′) =
f(sk, rk) for some sk, rk such that sk + rk = l. Thus, it
should not be hard to see that the privacy condition is met
so long as the following equations hold:
f(s, r) + f(s′, r′) = f(s′′, r′′) + f(s′′′, r′′′) (6)
for all 0 ≤ s, r, s′, r′, s′′, r′′, s′′′, r′′′ ≤ l−1 such that s+r =
s′ + r′ = s′′ + r′′ = s′′′ + r′′′ = l − 1;
f(s, r) + f(s′, r′) = f(s′′, r′′) (7)
for all 0 ≤ s, r, s′, r′ ≤ l − 1 and all 0 ≤ s′′, r′′ ≤ l such
that s+ r = s′ + r′ = l − 1 and s′′ + r′′ = l, and
f(s, r) = f(s′, r′) (8)
for all 0 ≤ s, r, s′, r′ ≤ l such that s + r = s′ + r′ = l.
By a simple algebra, one can verify that for the choice of
ps,r(s, r) specified in the protocol, the equations (6)-(8) are
met, and the RP protocol satisfies the privacy condition. This
completes the proof.
V. THE PIR-CSI–II PROBLEM
A. Proof of Converse for Theorem 2
Lemma 3. For M = 2, CII ≤ 1; for 2 < M ≤ K − 1,
CII ≤
1
2 , and for M = K , CII ≤ 1.
Proof: Fix an arbitrary W ∈ [K] and Y = Y [S,C] for
arbitrary S ∈ S and C ∈ C such that I [W,S] = 1. Let S =
{i1, . . . , iM} and C = {ci1 , . . . , ciM }. Consider a queryQ =
Q[W,S,C] and an answer A = A[W,S,C].
For the cases of M = 2 and M = K , it suffices to
show that H(A) ≥ L. Note that H(A) ≥ H(A|Q, Y ) =
H(A,XW |Q, Y ), where the equality follows from the re-
coverability condition and the chain rule of entropy, and
H(A,XW |Q, Y ) = H(XW |Q, Y ) + H(A|Q,XW , Y ) ≥
H(XW ), where the inequality follows from the indepen-
dence of XW and (Q, Y ), and the non-negativity of entropy.
Putting these arguments together, H(A) ≥ H(XW ) = L.
For the cases of 3 ≤ M ≤ K − 1, we need to show that
H(A) ≥ 2L. By the argument above,
H(A) ≥ H(XW ) +H(A|Q,XW , Y ). (9)
To lower bound H(A|Q,XW , Y ), we arbitrarily choose a
message, say XW ′ , such that I
[W ′,S] = 1. By the privacy
and recoverability conditions, there exists Y ′ = Y [S
′,C′] for
some S′ ∈ S and some C′ ∈ C such that I [W
′,S′] = 1 and
H(XW ′ |A,Q, Y ′) = 0. Since conditioning does not increase
the entropy, then H(XW ′ |A,Q,XW , Y, Y ′) = 0. Thus,
H(A|Q,XW , Y ) ≥ H(A|Q,XW , Y, Y
′)
= H(A,XW ′ |Q,XW , Y, Y
′) (10)
= H(XW ′ |Q,XW , Y, Y
′)
+H(A|Q,XW , XW ′ , Y, Y
′), (11)
where (10) holds because H(A,XW ′ |Q,XW , Y, Y ′) =
H(A|Q,XW , Y, Y ′) + H(XW ′ |A,Q,XW , Y, Y ′), and
H(XW ′ |A,Q,XW , Y, Y ′) = 0 (by the assumption);
and (11) follows from the chain rule of entropy.
Since XW , Y , XW ′ , and Y
′ are linear functions, either
(i) H(XW ′ |XW , Y, Y ′) = H(XW ′), i.e., XW ′ is inde-
pendent of (XW , Y, Y
′), or (ii) H(XW ′ |XW , Y, Y ′) = 0,
i.e., XW ′ is recoverable from (XW , Y, Y
′). In the
case (i), H(XW ′ |XW , Y, Y ′) = H(XW ′), and ac-
cordingly, H(XW ′ |Q,XW , Y, Y ′) = H(XW ′) since
Q→ (XW , Y, Y ′)→ XW ′ is a Markov chain.
Rewriting (11),
H(A|Q,XW , Y ) ≥ H(XW ′)
+H(A|Q,XW , XW ′ , Y, Y
′)
≥ H(XW ′). (12)
By (9) and (12), H(A) ≥ H(XW ) +H(XW ′) = 2L.
In the case (ii), H(XW ′ |XW , Y, Y ′) = 0, and subse-
quently, H(XW ′ |Q,XW , Y, Y ′) = 0. Again, by the linearity
of XW , Y , XW ′ , and Y
′, it follows that
Y = cWXW + cW ′XW ′ + Z
and
Y ′ = c′WXW + c
′
W ′XW ′ + c
′Z
for some c′W , c
′
W ′ , c
′ ∈ F×q , where Z =
∑
i∈S\{W,W ′} ciXi.
To lower bound H(A|Q,XW , Y ), we choose an arbi-
trary message, say XW ′′ , such that I
[W ′′,S] = 0. Again,
by the privacy and recoverability conditions, there exists
Y ′′ = Y [S
′′,C′′] for some S′′ ∈ S and some C′′ ∈ C such that
I [W
′′,S′′] = 1 and H(XW ′′ |A,Q, Y ′′) = 0, and accordingly,
H(XW ′′ |A,Q,XW , Y, Y ′′) = 0. Similar to (11),
H(A|Q,XW , Y ) ≥ H(XW ′′ |Q,XW , Y, Y
′′)
+H(A|Q,XW , XW ′′ , Y, Y
′′). (13)
Similarly as in the case (i), if XW ′′ is independent of
(Q,XW , Y, Y
′′), then H(A) ≥ H(XW ) +H(XW ′′ ) = 2L.
If XW ′′ is recoverable from (Q,XW , Y, Y
′′), then
Y ′′ = c′′W ′′XW ′′ + c
′′(cW ′XW ′ + Z)
for some c′′W ′′ , c
′′ ∈ F×q . Note that XW ′′ is independent
of (Q,XW ′ , Y
′, Y ′′) since XW ′′ is not recoverable from
c′WXW + c
′Z and c′′W ′′XW ′′ + c
′′Z , or equivalently, from
Y ′ and Y ′′ given XW ′ . Also, XW ′ is independent of
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(Q, Y ′, Y ′′) since XW ′ is not recoverable from Y
′ and Y ′′.
Thus,
H(A) ≥ H(A|Q, Y ′, Y ′′)
= H(A,XW ′ , XW ′′ |Q, Y
′, Y ′′) (14)
= H(XW ′ , XW ′′ |Q, Y
′, Y ′′)
+H(A|Q,XW ′ , XW ′′ , Y
′, Y ′′)
≥ H(XW ′ , XW ′′ |Q, Y
′, Y ′′)
≥ H(XW ′ |Q, Y
′, Y ′′)
+H(XW ′′ |Q,XW ′ , Y
′, Y ′′)
= H(XW ′) +H(XW ′′ ) (15)
where (14) holds because H(XW ′ |A,Q, Y ′) = 0 and
H(XW ′′ |A,Q, Y ′′) = 0 (by the recoverability condi-
tion), and accordingly, H(XW ′ |A,Q, Y ′, Y ′′) = 0 and
H(XW ′′ |A,Q,XW ′ , Y ′, Y ′′) = 0; (15) holds sinceXW ′ and
XW ′′ are independent of (Q, Y
′, Y ′′) and (Q,XW ′ , Y
′, Y ′′),
respectively. Thus,H(A) ≥ H(XW ′)+H(XW ′′) = 2L.
B. Proof of Achievability for Theorem 2
In this section, we propose a PIR-CSI–II protocol for each
of the cases of M = 2 (case 1), 3 ≤ M ≤ K2 (case 2),
K
2 + 1 ≤M ≤ K − 1 (case 3), and M = K (case 4).
Assume, w.l.o.g., that W = {1}, S = {1, . . . ,M}, and
C = {c1, . . . , cM}.
Proposed Protocols for Cases 1-4: The proposed protocol
for each case consists of four steps, where the steps 2-4 are
the same as the steps 2-4 in the RP protocol (Section IV-B),
and the step 1 of the proposed protocols are as follows:
Case 1: The user randomly selects the demand index W ,
(i.e., 1) with probability 1
K
, or the other index in S (i.e., 2)
with probability K−1
K
, and it creates two sets Q1 = {i} and
Q′1 = {c}, where i is the selected index by the user, and c
is chosen uniformly at random from F×q .
Case 2: The user creates two (ordered) sets Q1, Q2 of
indices in [K], each of size M − 1, and two (ordered) sets
Q′1, Q
′
2 of elements in F
×
q , each of size M − 1.
For constructing Q1 and Q2, the user first chooses an
integer r randomly according to a pmf pr(r) given by
pr(r) =
{
2(M−1)
K
, r =M − 2,
1− 2(M−1)
K
, r =M − 1.
If r = M − 1, the user randomly selects r indices from
R , [K] \ S. If r = M − 2, the user selects the index W ,
and r randomly chosen indices from R. Denote by U the set
of M − 1 selected indices from W and R. Then, the user
creates the sets Q1 = {2, . . . ,M} and Q2 = U .
For constructing Q′1 and Q
′
2, the user creates the set
Q′1 = {c2, . . . , cM}, and creates the set Q
′
2 by randomly
choosing M − 1 elements from F×q .
Case 3: The user creates two (ordered) sets Q1, Q2 of
indices in [K], each of sizeM , and two (ordered) sets Q′1, Q
′
2
of elements in F×q , each of size M .
For constructingQ1 andQ2, the user begins with choosing
an integer s at random according to a pmf ps(s) given by
ps(s) =
{
1− 2(K−M)
K
, s = 2M −K − 1,
2(K−M)
K
, s = 2M −K.
If s = 2M − K , the user randomly selects s indices from
S \W . If s = 2M −K − 1, the user selects the index W
together with s randomly chosen indices from S\W . Denote
by U the set of 2M −K selected indices from S. Then, the
user creates the sets Q1 = S and Q2 = U ∪ ([K] \ S).
The user also creates the set Q′1 = {c, c2, . . . , cM} where
c is randomly chosen from F×q \ {c1}, and creates the set Q
′
2
by randomly choosing M elements from F×q .
Case 4: The user creates two sets Q1 = [K] and Q
′
1 =
{c, c2, . . . , cK} where c is randomly chosen from F×q \{c1}.
Lemma 4. The proposed protocols for M = 2, 3 ≤M ≤ K2 ,
K
2 +1 ≤M ≤ K−1, and M = K are PIR-CSI–II protocols,
and achieve the rates 1, 12 ,
1
2 , and 1, respectively.
Proof: The proof of the achievability rate of the proposed
protocols follows the exact same line as in the proof of the
achievability rate of the RP protocol in Lemma 2. Moreover,
by the structure of the proposed protocols, it should not be
hard to see that the recoverability condition is met. Similarly
as in the proof of Lemma 2, to prove the privacy of the
proposed protocols, it suffices to show that P(Q|W = W ′)
is the same for all W ′ ∈ [K], where Q , Q1 for the cases 1
and 4, and Q , {Q1, Q2} for the cases 2 and 3. (Note
that all possible sets Q′1 are equiprobable, and all possible
collections {Q′1, Q
′
2} are equiprobable.) The proof of privacy
of the proposed protocol for each case is as follows.
Case 1: Consider an arbitrary Q = Q1. Take an arbitrary
W ′ ∈ [K]. There are two cases: (i) Q = {W ′}, and (ii)
Q = {W ′′} for some W ′′ 6= W ′.
In the case (i),
P(Q|W = W ′) =
∑
W ′′ 6=W ′
P(Q|W =W ′,S = {W ′,W ′′})
× P(S = {W ′,W ′′}|W =W ′)
=
1
K
(16)
since ∑
W ′′ 6=W ′
P(Q|W = W ′,S = {W ′,W ′′})
= (K − 1)P(Q|W =W ′,S = {W ′,W ′′}),
P(Q|W = W ′,S = {W ′,W ′′}) =
1
K
,
and
P(S = {W ′,W ′′}|W =W ′) =
1
K − 1
.
In the case (ii),
P(Q|W =W ′) = P(Q|W = W ′,S = {W ′,W ′′})
× P(S = {W ′,W ′′}|W =W ′)
=
1
K
(17)
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since
P(Q|W =W ′,S = {W ′,W ′′}) =
K − 1
K
,
and
P(S = {W ′,W ′′}|W =W ′) =
1
K − 1
.
By (16) and (17), P(Q|W = W ′) is the same for all
W ′ ∈ [K].
Case 2: Consider an arbitrary Q = {Q1, Q2}. Take an
arbitrary W ′ ∈ [K]. There are two cases: (i) W ′ ∈ Q1∪Q2,
and (ii) W ′ 6∈ Q1 ∪Q2.
In the case (i), w.l.o.g., assume that W ′ ∈ Q1. Thus,
P(Q|W =W ′) = P(Q|W = W ′,S = W ′ ∪Q2)
× P(S = W ′ ∪Q2|W = W
′)
=
2(M − 1)
K
(
K−M
M−2
)(
K−1
M−1
) (18)
since
P(Q|W =W ′,S = W ′ ∪Q2) =
2(M − 1)
K
(
K−M
M−2
) ,
and
P(S = W ′ ∪Q2|W = W
′) =
1(
K−1
M−1
) .
In the case (ii),
P(Q|W =W ′) = P(Q|W = W ′,S = W ′ ∪Q1)
× P(S = W ′ ∪Q1|W = W
′)
+ P(Q|W = W ′,S = W ′ ∪Q2)
× P(S = W ′ ∪Q2|W = W
′)
=
2(K − 2(M − 1))
K
(
K−M
M−1
)(
K−1
M−1
) (19)
since
P(Q|W = W ′,S =W ′ ∪Q1)
= P(Q|W =W ′,S =W ′ ∪Q2)
=
K − 2(M − 1)
K
(
K−M
M−1
) ,
and
P(S =W ′ ∪Q1|W =W
′)
= P(S = W ′ ∪Q2|W = W
′)
=
1(
K−1
M−1
) .
Since (18) and (19) are equal, then P(Q|W = W ′) is the
same for all W ′ ∈ [K].
Case 3: Consider an arbitrary Q = {Q1, Q2}. Take an
arbitraryW ′ ∈ [K]. There are two cases: (i),W ′ ∈ Q1∩Q2,
and (ii) W ′ 6∈ Q1 ∩Q2.
In the case (i),
P(Q|W = W ′) = P(Q|W = W ′,S = Q1)
× P(S = Q1|W =W
′)
+ P(Q|W =W ′,S = Q2)
× P(S = Q2|W =W
′)
=
2(2M −K)
K
(
M−1
2M−K−1
)(
K−1
M−1
) (20)
since
P(Q|W =W ′,S = Q1)
= P(Q|W = W ′,S = Q2)
=
2M −K
K
(
M−1
2M−K−1
) ,
and
P(S = Q1|W = W
′)
= P(S = Q2|W =W
′)
=
1(
K−1
M−1
) .
In the case (ii), w.l.o.g., assume that W ′ ∈ Q1. Thus,
P(Q|W = W ′) = P(Q|W = W ′,S = Q1)
× P(S = Q1|W =W
′)
=
2(K −M)
K
(
M−1
2M−K
)(
K−1
M−1
) (21)
since
P(Q|W = W ′,S = Q1) =
2(K −M)
K
(
M−1
2M−K
) ,
and
P(S = Q1|W =W
′) =
1(
K−1
M−1
) .
Again, (20) and (21) are equal, and P(Q|W = W ′) is the
same for all W ′ ∈ [K].
Case 4: Since Q = Q1 = [K], then P(Q|W = W ′) = 1
for all W ′ ∈ [K].
This completes the proof.
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